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SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' DECEMBER 10, 2009, MEETING WITH
INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTER NATALEGAWA

Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, reasons 1.4 (b+d).

¶1. (SBU) December 10, 2009; 4:15 p.m.; Bali Democracy Forum;
Bali, Indonesia.

¶2. (SBU) Participants:

U.S.

Under Secretary William Burns
Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, Embassy Jakarta
Scot Marciel, EAP Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Dan Rochman, Embassy Jakarta political officer (notetaker)

INDONESIA

Marty Natalegawa, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Bunyan Saptomo, Director, Directorate of North and Central
America, Department of Foreign Affairs
Department of Foreign Affairs notetaker

¶3. (C) SUMMARY In a December 10 meeting with Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa on the margins of the second annual Bali Democracy Forum (BDF), Under Secretary Bill Burns stressed the importance of translating the Comprehensive Partnership (CP) into tangible achievements, such as the signing of the Peace Corps MOU, in advance of an anticipated Presidential visit next year. In response to U/S Burns' suggestion that Indonesia move forward on ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty prior to the United States, Natalegawa said the GOI was considering that step. Natalegawa said the GOI was studying Japanese and Australian regional architecture proposals but did not want to act too quickly to add to the list of existing structures. He said Indonesia would continue its efforts on Burma and the Middle East and was thinking seriously about how it could help in Afghanistan. Natalegawa said the onus was on Iran to respond positively to the IAEA Tehran Research Reactor proposal. On climate change, the GOI was working to craft specific sectoral targets for emissions reductions in support of President Yudhoyono's ambitious overall targets. Natalegawa noted he hoped to have an opportunity to visit Washington in coming months to help set the stage for a Presidential visit to Jakarta. END SUMMARY.

BDF AND COMPREHENSIVE PARTNERSHIP

¶4. (C) FM Natalegawa stressed how pleased he and President Yudhoyono were that U/S Burns could participate in the BDF. The BDF's potential to promote democratization came from its inclusivity and the fact that it was not simply a discussion

among likeminded nations. Natalegawa noted that U/S Burns' visit to Bali and Jakarta for bilateral Strategic Consultations was one in an ongoing string of productive high-level bilateral interactions, including discussions between Presidents Obama and Yudhoyono and between FM Natalegawa and Secretary Clinton at the Singapore APEC Leaders Meeting that underscored the deepening and strengthening of U.S.-Indonesia relations. Natalegawa noted that the Secretary's call to him in advance of President Obama's speech on Afghanistan reflected the value of close consultations on key issues. With the increasing pace of high-level discussions as background, it was important to reach a number of early achievements, such as the signing of the Peace Corps MOU, to sustain momentum for a potential visit by President Obama in mid-2010, Natalegawa concluded.

¶15. (C) U/S Burns stressed that the U.S. side also committed to translating the CP into tangible achievements. Beyond the Peace Corps MOU, it would be beneficial to conclude the science and technology agreement in advance of the planned visit to Indonesia of Presidential Science Envoy Bruce Alberts in mid-January. Fast action on the proposed Defense Cooperation and Overseas Private Investment Corporation agreement would also help lay the groundwork for a successful Presidential visit.

NONPROLIFERATION

¶16. (C) U/S Burns noted Indonesia's admirable record of leadership on nonproliferation issues. By signing the Additional Protocol, Indonesia had set a strong example for

JAKARTA 00002071 002 OF 003

other Southeast Asian nations. Similarly, it would be beneficial if the GOI moved forward quickly on ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Doing so in advance of the United States would further solidify Indonesia's leadership role, and could provide a positive influence on ratification efforts in the United States. Natalegawa agreed that the anticipated visit of President Obama gave added incentive to make progress on all elements of the CP, including nonproliferation. While Indonesia's intention has been to begin ratification immediately after the United States, the option of doing so first had begun to look increasingly attractive.

REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE AND BURMA

¶17. (C) FM Natalegawa said Indonesia was studying Japan's proposed East Asia Community and Australia's Asia-Pacific Community proposals but did not want to act too quickly. The situation was fluid, so a new structure, if locked in, could become quickly outdated. The general regional trend was toward greater regional integration, and Indonesia continued to feel that the United States must be a key actor in the region. The GOI remained to be convinced that any of the proposals currently on the table would be the best addition to current structures. Meanwhile, within the existing framework, the GOI felt it had an important role to play on problem-solving within Southeast Asia, including on Burma, where it would continue to work behind the scenes to encourage the Burmese generals to open dialogue with the opposition and ethnic groups.

IRAN AND NORTH KOREA

¶18. (C) U/S Burns and Natalegawa agreed on the importance of staying in touch on Iran and North Korea nuclear issues. On Iran, U/S Burns pointed out that the IAEA's Tehran Research Reactor proposal offered at the Geneva talks was a promising beginning, but Iran had backed away from its initial acceptance, in part due to domestic difficulties. Nevertheless, the administration's patience was not unlimited, and if Iran continued to refuse to take meaningful steps, we would have to consider other steps. Natalegawa said Iran's internal situation was not conducive for positive

movement and agreed that the ball was firmly in Iran's court.

Indonesia would do what it could to convince Iran to take advantage of the opportunities before it.

MIDDLE EAST AND AFGHANISTAN

¶9. (C) Natalegawa said Indonesia's contribution to Middle East peace efforts had been modest and focused on Palestinian capacity building, including training for Palestinian diplomats. Indonesia hoped to be able to play a similar "niche" role in Afghanistan through police training.

Natalegawa noted that because of intense interest in the Middle East among the Indonesian public, the GOI was somewhat constrained in what it could do publicly on that issue. U/S Burns expressed appreciation for Indonesian efforts on the Middle East, encouraged the GOI to consider steps it could take to reach out to Israel, and said it would be useful to maintain close contact on both that issue and on efforts in support of Afghanistan.

CLIMATE CHANGE

¶10. (C) Turning to climate change, Natalegawa said it was not productive to focus solely on whether emissions reduction commitments were legally binding or simply political commitments. What was more important was inclusiveness. Developing countries must not see climate change as a matter to be left to the developed world to solve. President Yudhoyono's ambitious stance on Indonesian emissions reflected the seriousness with which he took the issue. Indonesia was working aggressively to craft specific sectoral targets for emissions reduction, since it did not make sense to get international assistance to support its efforts before those efforts were defined, Natalegawa added.

PRESIDENTIAL VISIT

¶11. (C) FM Natalegawa said the coming six months would be extremely busy but also productive, in preparation for the anticipated visit of President Obama. The FM added that he

JAKARTA 00002071 003 OF 003

was considering a visit to Washington in advance of a Presidential visit to Indonesia in order to help shape the agenda.

¶12. (U) U/S Burns cleared this message.

HUME